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I have come to find it odd to think of there being a single correct idea of
forgiveness, in the way that there is a correct theory of the structure of DNA.
Forgiveness is a variable human process and a practice with culturally distinctive
versions – Margaret Urban Walker (2006; p. 152)
Deconstructed Black Forest Cake: ‘The elements of Black Forest Cake—
chocolate cake and pudding, cherries, whipped cream, and kirsch—are
reimagined as sensuous, separate bites and sips’ – www.epicurious.com

Forgiveness—An ordered pluralism

The philosophical literature on forgiveness displays a puzzling schism. There are those
who conceive of forgiveness as necessarily earned, normally through remorseful
apology; and there are those who conceive of it as fundamentally non-earned or
unconditional—a gift.1 I shall label the two broad conceptions ‘Moral Justice
Forgiveness’ and ‘Gifted Forgiveness’ respectively. It is startling how different they are,
both psychologically and normatively. Psychologically speaking they are poles apart. The
first involves a stance of significant moral demand, while the second precisely does not—

1

For the former view, see for instance Hampton and Murphy (1998), Hieronymi (2001),

and Griswold (2007). For the latter view, see for instance Calhoun (1992), Garrard and
McNaughton (2004), Pettigrove (2012), and Allais (2013). For explicitly pluralist
positions see Walker (2006); and Bennett (2003), though the pluralism he argues for there
is not designed to include what I am calling Gifted Forgiveness.

its non-demandingness is its distinctive psychological and ethical feature. Normatively
speaking too they appear to be polar opposites. Whereas the first issues forgiveness only
on condition of remorse (typically requiring this to be made explicit in apology, with
some accounts adding further requirements along the way), the second self-consciously
suspends this condition wholesale, forgiving for free. Granted that both conceptions offer
life-like portraits of something called forgiveness, we face an intriguing philosophical
puzzle: how can they both be convincing likenesses of moral practices that rightfully go
by the same name? This is the puzzle I aim to solve.

It is a feature of many social practices, and I would contend some moral practices too,
that the meanings operative in the basic form of the practice tend to become implicit and
compacted, entering our spontaneous second nature as to how we understand our world.
These taken-for-granted meanings may then be more passively and discreetly operative in
any new, hermeneutically parasitic practices that evolve to serve essentially the same
social or moral purpose but in modified form. Take, for instance, culinary practice: only
once we already have the idea—the gustatory institution, so to speak—of black forest
gateau, might we be able to ‘reimagine’ and comprehend its elemental ingredients of
chocolate cake, cherries, whipped cream, and kirsch served in ‘deconstructed’ form as
‘sensuous bites and sips’ artfully distributed on a restaurant plate. The deconstructed
version only makes proper sense if it is intelligible as a novel iteration of some prior
version of itself—perhaps the familiar seventies classic, or the original German
Schwarzwälder Kirschtorte.
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It is in our nature as cultural beings to innovate, and one suspects that the evolution of
many social-cultural practices from the silly to the sublime arise this way—the very idea
of a spoof movie, for example, or the development of the unreliable narrator in modernist
fiction, or perhaps even the historical progression from representational to abstract
painting. In all these cases, the intelligibility of the newer practice is at least implicitly
dependent upon on meanings operative in the original one: you cannot make sense of a
spoof spy movie unless you already get spy movies; you cannot understand what is going
on in unreliable narration unless you read it as playing on a prior habit of reliability; and
appreciating abstract painting may similarly depend upon seeing how it can be satisfying
to some of the same aspects of sensibility as a traditional painting. The key is in sensing
how one practice is derived from another, the meanings at work in the original becoming
embedded and merely implicit in the later, derived variation.

But regardless of what one may think of this as a purportedly general cultural
phenomenon, I shall only be arguing along these lines very specifically in respect of the
two radically different conceptions of forgiveness identified above. The resultant picture
will be one that resolves their differences by integrating the two varieties of forgiveness
into a single explanatory order, so that one variety is represented as the explanatorily
basic or (as I shall call it) paradigm case, in relation to which the other variety is
explained as the derived, essentially parasitic and more contingent iteration. Though
admittedly ambitious given the schism, I believe that some such unified picture is
achievable, and can deliver an integrated and philosophically satisfying account—one
with the advantage of any pluralism, namely that it begins from a stance of everyday
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truthfulness about the manifestly diverse forms of forgiveness that are practised here and
now, let alone elsewhere and at other times, but which also has the advantage that it has
more explanatory musculature than any mere acknowledgement of plurality could hope
to build. Most importantly it can explain how on earth two such dramatically different
responses to wrongdoing are rooted in one and the same moral kind, so as to both belong
to the moral genus forgiveness.

To preview: In the first section I shall explain my method of paradigm-based explanation,
representing it as a more straightforward and transparent way of achieving the very same
explanatory pay-off that certain well-disciplined State of Nature stories are designed to
achieve. In section 2 I shall hypothesise Moral Justice Forgiveness as the paradigm case
of forgiveness—not merely in the sense of being a canonical case of forgiveness but,
crucially, the explanatorily basic case. In section 3, now standing back from its
interpersonal psychology to consider forgiveness rather as a moral-social practice, I will
propose a conception of the most basic point and purpose of Moral Justice Forgiveness;
after which I will go on in section 4 to ‘test’ the hypothesis of its explanatory primacy by
seeing how far the practice of Gifted Forgiveness—apparently a very different moral
formation—can be convincingly represented as a contingent cultural iteration of Moral
Justice Forgiveness, our candidate paradigm case. On the face of it, a positive result
would be most surprising, given that the two kinds of forgiveness appear as polar
opposites. But I believe that the proposed paradigm-based method will prove capable of
revealing the second as a somewhat disguised variation on the first—as will become clear
once we grasp two things: first, that the most basic moral-social role played by the two
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practices can be seen, when viewed from a distance, to be the same; and second, that the
moral meanings at work in Gifted Forgiveness are directly parasitic on those at work in
Moral Justice Forgiveness. The first reveals their common function; the second reveals
their order of conceptual and genetic priority.

The resulting account will thus achieve two main things. It will explain our puzzle,
namely, how it is that the apparently starkly disunified formations of forgiveness
represented by Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness respectively are in fact
fundamentally unified. Moreover it will do this in a manner that preserves a desirable
pluralism at the level of interpersonal moral psychology regarding the nature of our
actual practices of forgiveness. And, second, it will show that certain key values or
purposes that are clearly served by forgiveness—and which are therefore quite rightly
focused on in much of the philosophical literature—can only be so served in virtue of the
fact that the more basic role is already being played, and without which these other,
secondary, values could not be realised except in deteriorated form. I shall postpone
stating the hypothesis about what that most basic role is until I have set the scene
methodologically.

1. Paradigm-Based Explanation

A philosophical method that is expressly designed to reveal the point or role of a given
concept or practice is State of Nature story telling. Such story telling is a species of
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genealogy—it is the kind of genealogy that posits ‘origins’, as opposed to the kind that
aims to show that there are none, on the grounds that all is history and contingency.
Foucault claims ‘History is the concrete body of a development…; and only a
metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin’ (Foucault, 1984; p.
80). But that is not true. It is not only a ‘metaphysician’ who might seek for necessity in
the idea of an origin, for there are other kinds of necessity besides metaphysical
necessity. She who posits origins need only believe there are some basic features of our
practices that are (more or less) a direct expression of human nature—a direct upshot of
human needs perhaps, or a manifestation of primary patterns of human emotion. There is
nothing of Foucault’s ‘metaphysician’ at work, for instance, in either of the two State of
Nature explanations from which I take my initial inspiration: Edward Craig’s Knowledge
and the State of Nature, and Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness.2

There are admittedly other worries besides Foucault’s. Anyone might justifiably raise an
eyebrow, after all, at the proposition that a creative fiction of a social setting that never
existed, albeit reassuringly laced with a few realistic evolutionary pressures, should issue
in a philosophical explanation of one of our actual conceptual or moral practices. I think
there is plenty to say that would lower the eyebrow; but it is not the present task to say it.
Rather than defending State of Nature explanation per se, my immediate purpose is to
show that there is a closely related alternative method that can deliver what Craig calls
‘practical explication’ more transparently than a tale from the State of Nature, since it can
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Craig (1990); Williams (2002).
6

do so without the fictionalising that puts some critics off. Thus paradigm-based
explanation.3

In order to present my proposed paradigm-based explanation, we must first achieve an
explicit account of how the State of Nature method is supposed to work. Only then will it
become evident that we can achieve the same explanatory result by other, more
transparent means. The key is to see that in this kind of State of Nature story (the kind
employed by both Craig and Williams) what is claimed about the State of Nature—for
instance, that it contains a concept or practice with such and such features—is really a
claim about what is basic (or ‘core’) in our actual concept or practice.4 The narrative
3

For the same methodological proposal in respect of blame, see Fricker (2014). For

another, closely related, methodological approach to forgiveness, see Warmke and
McKenna (2013), though they are not focused on the point and purpose of forgiveness
but rather on identifying ‘exemplar’ cases which they regard as enjoying ‘explanatory
privilege’ in the sense that they are the key to understanding other cases (see esp. p. 203).
Charles Griswold also employs the notion of a paradigm case of forgiveness in relation to
which other kinds may be understood, but he uses ‘paradigm’ to indicate an ideal kind of
forgiveness, with other kinds figuring as more or less pale approximations (Griswold
2007).
4

Craig was entirely clear about this in the 1990 book, but a particularly explicit

subsequent comment is nonetheless helpful: ‘I had to maintain that the circumstances that
favour the formation of the concept of knowledge still exist, or did until very recently,
since otherwise I would have had no convincing answer to the obvious question why it
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dimension of the fiction tends to mislead in this regard, because it encourages one to
mistake a deliberately fictional (or part-fictional) genealogy of X for a slap-dash attempt
at a real history of X.5 More precisely, what tends to mislead us is that such a story can
seem as if it purports to tell us how we actually came to have a practice of X with this or
that feature, when really it is an attempt to do something quite different: it is an effort to
substantiate a philosophical claim about which features of our actual practice are more or
less necessary and which features are increasingly contingent. The ones posited as

should have remained in use, nor any support for my thesis that the method reveals the
core of the concept as it is to be found now’ (Craig, 2007; p. 191). Williams too—whose
approach was more historical in emphasis—was committed to the idea that there was
something necessary at the core of what had been shaped and re-shaped by different
moments of history. In his account the object of these contingent re-shapings was the
human value of truthfulness, and at its core are the proto virtues of Accuracy and
Sincerity, as created by basic social pressures in the State of Nature.
5

We must resist exaggerating, however, the difference between a scholarly real-historical

account and a historical genealogy, for, as Philip Kitcher observes, even the most
disciplined real-historical account will have to present itself as a ‘how-possibly’ rather
than a ‘how-actually’ explanation, given that parts of the story are so remote that we have
too little evidence to go on (Kitcher 2011; pp. 11-12).
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necessary are thereby posited as still present in the actual practice, though possibly
suppressed, concealed, or displaced within it.6

It is important to appreciate that ‘necessary’ here does not mean metaphysically
necessary (Foucault’s mistake). Rather it means necessary in one of a range of qualified
senses that should be made explicit by whoever is telling the story. In Craig and Williams
it means ‘practically’ necessary in the manner of basic survival needs plus some further
social pressures that grow directly out of them; but it might equally be closer to a claim
about human emotional nature—something conceived as ‘humanly necessary’. That is
how P. F. Strawson conceives the status of our natural ‘reactive attitudes and feelings’
towards each other when we feel, among other things, disapprobation or indignation for a
wrong done, or indeed forgiveness for one repudiated.7 (Such a ‘humanly necessary’ kind
of necessity is the one I shall go on to exploit here for purposes of explaining forgiveness,
though not in relation to a State of Nature.) How shall we dispense with the State of
Nature itself? The trick is to be transparent about the claim of necessity, and unabashed at
its being hostage to empirical fortune regarding the possibility that an extraordinary
anthropological case might emerge as a counter-example—we might be quite happy to

6

As Williams makes clear, there can also be purely historical genealogies, which, I take

it, would not be committed to any kind of necessity. But most philosophical genealogies
are curious hybrids of ‘historical’ and ‘imaginary’. See Williams, 2002; ch. 2.
7

The phrase ‘humanly necessary’ is from a paper that predates ‘Freedom and

Resentment’, however. (See Strawson, 1961.)
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settle for nearly humanly necessary after all.8 We should be unabashed too about the
possibility that some of the features we find deep in human nature might not be remotely
desirable—they may need suppressing or containing (like violence), controlling or
tempering (like retaliation), balancing or civilizing (like power). For a pattern of
emotional reaction to be identified as deeply rooted in human nature entails exposing it to
potentially critical attention, and to the possibility that it needs special efforts of
remoulding in moral culture.9 In sum, instead of telling a tale of origins, paradigm-based
explanation tries out an explicit hypothesis as to what particular form of the practice is
functionally basic, partly with a view to clear-eyed critical reflection on how far that
practice makes a desirable and progressive contribution to shared moral life.

Furthermore, such a hypothesis causes us to be explicit about something that is
sometimes only implicit in State of Nature stories: that the contrast between what is
allegedly necessary and what is contingent is also, and more importantly, one between
the formation of a practice that is explanatorily basic and other formations of the practice
which are best explained as derivative—as contingent cultural iterations of the basic
paradigm. Whereas in genealogies that are purely historical the idea of genealogical
priority can only indicate a causal-historical priority; in (what Williams calls) imaginary
8

Strawson was entirely aware that the fact of moral diversity should make one ‘chary’ of

advancing any features of moral psychology as essential or universal, and allowed that
his own depiction of the moral reactive attitudes might unwittingly carry some contingent
cultural inflection (see Strawson 1974; p. 24).
9

I thank T. M. Scanlon for pressing this point in correspondence.
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genealogies, genealogical priority is largely a metaphor for explanatory priority,
regardless of what actually (in historical time) came first. The hoped for philosophical
pay-off, therefore, will always be of the generic form ‘the fact that we have a practice of
X is explained by this practice being present in, or derived from, the practice of X that
human beings have in the State of Nature’—which means the practice of X that human
society is bound to develop given certain basic aspects of human nature and need. This
claim of explanatory priority is therefore the lynchpin of the more transparent version of
the method I want to offer, a method designed to deliver the explanatory pay-off but
without all the fictionalising. Here is the proposal. We present a hypothesis about what
the paradigm practice of X is like—i.e. the form of the practice that we hypothesise as
displaying its most basic point and purpose—and we then test out the hypothesis by
seeing if we can plausibly represent other, non-paradigm forms of the practice as
derivative. They may, for instance, display the same distinctive point and purpose—play
the same basic role in moral life—but in a dependent, and perhaps deceptively obscured
form.

In other work I have employed this paradigm-based method in relation to blame, and I
argued that the paradigm case of blame is Communicative Blame—where, if you wrong
me, I react by communicating to you that you are at fault, and where my communication
is charged with some kind of blame-feeling.10 We then ask what the point or role of the
paradigm case is: what’s the point of Communicative Blame? And the answer given is
that Communicative Blame aims to inspire remorse understood as pained understanding
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See Fricker (2014).
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of the wrong one has done. Since I must here merely impose this conception of blame’s
basic point as a hefty premise to what follows, let me alleviate its weight a little by
pointing out, first, that its substance is a version of a commonly accepted everyday
conception; and furthermore that in accepting it, if only for argument’s sake, we are in
good company historically, for it is the view taken by Adam Smith:

The object…which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our
enemy feel pain in his turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account
of his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and to make him sensible,
that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner… To
bring him back to a more just sense of what is due to other people, to make him
sensible of what he owes us, and of the wrong that he has done to us, is frequently
the principal end proposed in our revenge, which is always imperfect when it
cannot accomplish this (Smith, 2009 [1759]; Part II, Sect. III, Ch. I; p. 115).

Blame may take many forms, and some of them we would be better off without, but for
purposes of argument let us agree that the role played by Communicative Blame in our
moral relations is to bring the wrongdoer and the blamer into an aligned moral
understanding of what has gone on between them, their understandings being naturally
inflected with emotions appropriate to their role as either subject or object of the
wrongdoing. Communicative Blame is thus seen to be driven by a morally constructive
energy whose purpose is shared moral understanding, where the culprit’s side of this
shared moral understanding will be constituted by remorse.
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With this claim about the basic point of blame now on the page as a premise to what
follows, we are equipped to apply the method of paradigm-based explanation to
forgiveness.

2. Moral Justice Forgiveness—the candidate paradigm case

Let us begin with the ‘humanly necessary’—the ‘reactive attitude and feeling’ of
forgiveness:

Besides resentment and gratitude, I mentioned just now forgiveness… To ask to
be forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude displayed in our actions was
such as might properly be resented and in part to repudiate that attitude for the
future…; and to forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the
resentment.11

11

Strawson (1974); p.6, italics added. For empirical reassurance that it is sensible to

regard not only blame but also forgiveness as having deep roots in human nature, see
Michael McCullough’s case for the view that ‘The human capacity for forgiveness, like
the human capacity for revenge, solved critical evolutionary problems for our ancestors,
and it’s still solving those problems today’ (McCullough 2008; p. xviii). See also
McCullough et al. (2013); and Petersen et al. who argue for a similar view, that ‘the mind
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If we accept that this (or something very close to it) is a description of a humanly
necessary reactive attitude of forgiveness, then we should accept it as a prime candidate
for an explanatorily basic form of forgiveness—our candidate paradigm case. But claims
of necessity are not to be made lightly, even when self-consciously made for
philosophical purposes from the armchair. We should briefly press the question whether
every aspect is plausibly built in to human moral nature. There are two aspects of
Strawson’s description that are worth subjecting to some pressure.

First, casting the repudiation in terms of an attitude towards not only the past deed but
also towards future conduct might strike one as something of an optional extra,
introducing a suspicion of contingency. Must the repudiator also be making a guarantee
as regards future conduct in order to be forgiven in this basic manner? Of course some
such firm intention to reform is generally to be hoped for, given the two parties are to
remain in each other’s lives; but perhaps (one might think) we should not build it into the
picture of what is being claimed as a humanly necessary moral reactive attitude.
However, a closer inspection of what is already at stake in any ‘repudiation’ of a bad
action (or, as I shall tend to put it, in any genuine feeling of remorse) reveals that the
future is already implicated.12 For any repudiation of an action of type X looks oddly
contains evolved programs that deploy both punitive and reparative strategies to deal with
transgressors’ (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2010; p. 75).
12

I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for urging me to see this point in terms of the very

grammar of emotions and attitudes such as remorse and repudiation.
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freeze-framed if we separate it off from the generalized attitude towards actions of that
type; and any such type-directed attitude commits the subject to a certain consistency
across logical space and time, so that it applies other things equal not only to the
particular token in the past but also to possible tokens in the future. Thus the futureoriented aspect of Strawson’s characterisation proves not to be overloaded, and remains
apt as a description of a basic reactive attitude.

Second, we should also pause to reflect on the normative dimension to Strawson’s
description. Are we sure it is necessary? The notion he uses is the forswearing of
resentment as a response to the wrongdoer’s repudiating what she did, and that is a more
normatively loaded construction than the alternative, more plainly descriptive
construction that would simply emphasise an observed tendency to relinquish resentment
as a response to the repudiation. Would this less explicitly normative construal be the
better candidate for our paradigm case? In order to answer this question, we need only
scrutinize the tendency to relinquish resentment towards a wrongdoer who now
repudiates what she has done. We find that our very tendency is explained by a normative
fact—the fact that the repudiation is at least a pro tanto reason to relinquish the
resentment. And so we discover that the normativity is built in to the tendency from the
start. Therefore there is no simpler, ‘merely descriptive’ construal that is not already
normatively structured, and it perhaps makes little odds whether in describing the
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reactive attitude of forgiveness we use an explicitly normative word such as ‘forswear’ or
a merely descriptive word such as ‘relinquish’. The normativity is already built in.13

There is furthermore an outstanding reason to favour an explicitly normative term, for it
strikes a note of self-discipline which rightly flags up the fact that even in the most basic
psychological formation there is an ever-present risk that the blame-feelings of those who
are morally wounded (I shall generally talk of ‘blame-feeling’ rather than the more
problematic ‘resentment’14) will over-reach themselves in some way, perhaps by
13

Victoria McGeer makes this point in connection with a neighbouring concern (about

blame’s regulatory function) directing our attention to Strawson’s own clarity on the
point (2013 pp. 177-8). For a fully elaborated account of the normative aspects of
reactive attitudes, see Darwall (2006). Although his focus is not on forgiveness, there is a
brief discussion of its second-personal character at pp. 72-73.
14

It is worth remembering that Strawson uses ‘resentment’ only in characterising

the pre-moral attitude, and switches to ‘moral indignation’ or (more weakly)
‘disapprobation’ for the vicarious, moral analogue (Strawson, 1974; p. 14). For my
part I am using the umbrella term ‘blame-feeling’ in order to stay neutral about
exactly what emotion(s) constitute feelings of blame, what the relation might be to
vengeance or retribution, and indeed whether there is in fact a diverse range of
emotions, including plain sorrow or pity or disappointment, that might play a proper
affective role in blame (conceived as finding fault), as I have argued in Fricker
2014. Glen Pettigrove has argued that forgiveness need not be the forswearing
specifically of resentment, because other emotions may be in play, though he
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lingering beyond the time or context in which they are justified, or by being more intense
than is justified by the wrong. Perhaps part of the explanation why blame-feeling tends
towards excess if left unchecked is that, as Jean Hampton candidly suggests, it is
pleasurable: ‘I suspect that we enjoy it not only because we enjoy asserting what we wish
our own worth to be, but also because the emotion encourages the belief that the
wrongdoer is “morally worse” than his victim’ (Hampton 1988, p. 60).15 This proneness
of blame-feeling to over-reach itself means that even in the basic case there is a selfdiscipline operative in our blaming moral responses, and hence a self-discipline in the
effort of relinquishing such feelings when they are no longer justified—the effort of so
relinquishing them is well described as ‘forswearing’. What Strawson’s use of the term
aptly implies is that while it is natural to let resentment go when we recognize it is no
longer justified, it is equally only natural to fail to let it go. The normativity that
permeates blame-feeling is what makes it the case that a wrongdoer earns forgiveness
through their remorseful acknowledgement of what they have done: other things equal,
their remorse makes it appropriate to forswear the corresponding blame-feeling. What we
find thus encoded in our moral human nature is the entirely familiar normative structure
admittedly mentions only a narrow class of rather belligerent alternatives such as
anger, rage, hatred, loathing, scorn, and contempt (Pettigrove 2012; p. 29). Jeffrey
Blustein has argued that the emotions that forgiveness overcomes need not be
retributive (Blustein 2014; ch. 1). See also Roberts (1995); and Pereboom (2013).
15

On this point, enlarged as a warning about institutionalized ‘atonement’, see Trudy

Govier: ‘People enjoy an elevated status when someone else is marked as a wrongdoer’
(Govier, 2009; p. 19).
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that is definitive of Moral Justice Forgiveness: blame-feeling is justified after
wrongdoing only until appropriate remorse is forthcoming. Our reactive attitudes, it
seems, are already attitudes of a simple interpersonal moral justice. I therefore propose
Moral Justice Forgiveness as our candidate paradigm case of forgiveness—the
explanatorily basic case, as delivered in Strawson’s description of the reactive attitude.

The hypothesis that Moral Justice Forgiveness is the paradigm case entails two
commitments: first, that the most basic moral-social role of Moral Justice Forgiveness
will turn out to be also that of Gifted Forgiveness, doubtless in heavily disguised form;
and, second, that our investigation will ultimately determine that Moral Justice
Forgiveness is the parent practice—exhibiting features that reveal it as prior and Gifted
Forgiveness as parasitic or dependent.

3. The Most Basic Point of Moral Justice Forgiveness

Now that the hypothesis to be tested is on the table, namely that the paradigm case of
forgiveness is Moral Justice Forgiveness, we can ask: what is the basic point and purpose
of that kind of forgiveness? Once we have an answer, we can look and see how far that
basic role is discernable in the raison d’être of Gifted Forgiveness too, and go on to
assess how far it is plausible to see gifted formations as contingent cultural iterations of
the basic moral justice formation. In order to bring the basic point of Moral Justice
Forgiveness into view, we need to go back a step so that we start from the point of
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Communicative Blame, as previously introduced. We accepted the premise that the point
of Communicative Blame is to inspire remorse in the wrongdoer as a matter of aligning
both parties’ moral understanding. Now this has a direct bearing on the point of Moral
Justice Forgiveness, for once the point of blame is achieved, if it is achieved, then
continued blame-feeling can serve no further moral purpose, but merely threatens to
fester if it is left unreleased from the individual’s psychology, or indeed thereby left
churning without movement in the moral social system. Once the communication of
blame has achieved its point, then continued blame-feeling becomes redundant; and
continuing to harbour blame-feeling that has been made redundant in this way is merely
to prolong ill-feeling to no purpose, risking corrosive effects on both parties and possibly
on other relationships into the bargain. All sides are better off without it, and the moment
of redundancy ushers in Moral Justice Forgiveness. The forswearing of blame-feeling
that has been made redundant by the wrongdoer’s remorse is Moral Justice Forgiveness.
Thus, I propose, the most basic (though not the only) point of Moral Justice Forgiveness
can be encapsulated as the forgiver’s liberation from redundant blame-feeling. That is,
liberation from blame-feeling that can serve no moral purpose—in this case, because it
has already done its job.

The idea that we need liberation from our feelings of blame when they are morally
redundant does not commit us to the puritanical idea that such redundant blame-feelings
are necessarily bad or corrosive. I am ready to accept that some of us can, frankly,
harbour quite a bit of residual blame-feeling with no intention of communicating it or
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expelling it in any other way, and it does us no harm at all, nor anyone else.16 Perhaps
some of the most generous-spirited individuals are best placed to contain such spikes of
unspent blame-feeling. An edge of unresolved resentments might make a person more
interesting, more funny, more morally aware, or more likeable—a touch of defiant
vulnerability worn on the sleeve might be decidedly preferable to the blandness of an
unremittingly resolved psyche. What the thesis about the point of paradigm forgiveness
does commit us to, however, is the view—which is hardly controversial—that on the
whole blame that lingers without the catharsis of communicative interpersonal expression
tends to corrupt the relationship in question, perhaps other relationships too, and indeed
the character and happiness of the blamer. Harbouring redundant blame is not always
bad; but it does tend to be. And this fact explains why human beings need to cultivate
moral practices that shape their natural moral reactive attitudes so that on the whole we
succeed in liberating ourselves from such potentially corrosive redundant blame-feelings.
That, as Hannah Arendt sagely observes, is how we consign our moral injuries to the
past.17 Blame-feeling, on the proposed picture, is not to be thought of as intrinsically
toxic. Rather, it is like salt: excess is bad for you (sometimes very bad), and deficiency is
bad for you (sometimes very bad); but there is a quantitative range that allows it to play
an essential role in the organism. On the view I am hypothesizing, Communicative Blame
16

I thank Lucy Allais and John Greenwood for each making this point in discussion.
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Although Arendt makes the point by way of other notions I would not wish to make

use of, such as men needing forgiveness in order to act freely, still the fundamental idea
that without forgiveness we cannot truly get past wrongs done to us seems exactly right.
See Arendt (1998/1958; pp. 238-43).
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introduces blame-feeling into the moral interpersonal system; and forgiveness expunges
the surplus which would otherwise tend to compromise the moral body.

4. Gifted Forgiveness as Moral Justice Forgiveness with one element displaced

Earlier I said the claim that Moral Justice Forgiveness is the paradigm case depends upon
our being able to convincingly represent other kinds of forgiveness as derived from it—as
contingent and perhaps hard-to-recognize cultural iterations of the basic practice. I
believe there are in fact many varieties of forgiveness (not all of them morally useful),
but I shall focus here exclusively on two formations of the broad kind I am calling Gifted
Forgiveness. So our question now is: can one or other formation of Gifted Forgiveness be
convincingly represented as a derivative cultural iteration of basic Moral Justice
Forgiveness? I think the answer is yes, and in effect I am asking us to think of the
ingredients of Moral Justice Forgiveness as being served up in one or other rearranged
form, rather as a restaurant might serve ‘deconstructed’ dishes whose elements are not
combined in the usual way, but instead arranged on the plate in unfamiliar order, perhaps
with all elements separated, or, as it might also be, with a key element at one remove
from the rest, so that had the diner not paid much attention to the description on the
menu, he might not initially recognize the cherries, kirsch and chocolate cake set out

21

before him as a variation on Black Forest Gateau—and yet, after a few bites, it will surely
dawn on him that these elements are together meeting the same gustatory brief.18

I remain entirely neutral as to whether deconstructed Black Forest Cake tastes as good as
the traditionally constructed original; but there is philosophical method in this
gastronomic frivolity, as I gestured at the outset. The culinary innovation is just one of
many possible examples of a deep and quite general creative tendency in human culture
to innovate and develop through the re-arrangement of elements: to compose variations
on a theme, to play on the techniques and meanings at work in an existing literary,
artistic, or moral form thereby creating something new, to achieve similar effects or
utilities of a social practice by different, sometimes more efficient, sometimes more
elaborate means, and quite generally to allow the meanings inherent in a practice to play
on each other and create a new way of doing an old thing, often with new layers of
meaning and value accruing. Such innovations are a matter of cultural evolution, and that
is essentially what I am proposing as our explanatory conceit in relation to the initially
baffling plurality of forgiveness: the non-paradigm formations of the practice of
forgiving, when looked at in the light of the basic point of the paradigm case, will
ultimately reveal themselves as normatively rearranged moral responses that work to the
same underlying moral brief—namely, to free the wronged party from blame-feeling that
18

From http://www.epicurious.com/recipes/food/views/deconstructed-black-forest-cake-

231450 The account of deconstructed recipes in general given there is ‘TREND:
Deconstructed desserts (breaking down a dish into its essential, components, then serving
the parts as a whole)’.
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is redundant in that it can serve no moral purpose. Accordingly I hope to show of two
formations of Gifted Forgiveness that, contrary to appearances, when considered in
abstraction from the distinctive interpersonal moral psychology of non-demand, we can
discern at a deeper level of their function and meaning that they are both cultural
reinventions of Moral Justice Forgiveness—its signature normative precondition of
aligned moral understanding being repositioned at one remove in time, or in social space,
or indeed both.

Temporal remove—Proleptic Gifted Forgiveness:
The first formation of Gifted Forgiveness on which I shall focus is, I propose,
exemplified in an emblematic and widely cited literary example drawn from Victor
Hugo’s Les Misérables.19 The Bishop forgives Jean Valjean, even covering for him to the
police, for betraying his trust and stealing the silver from the rectory, despite the fact that
Valjean at the time expresses no remorse and shows no other sign of appreciating the
moral significance of his misdeed; and yet the Bishop’s generosity later comes to mark a
turning point for Valjean. This is an archetypal case of Gifted Forgiveness, but (here’s the
point) we can only make sense of it by thinking of it as the Bishop’s giving Valjean
something that normally needs to be earned through remorseful moral understanding but
on this occasion isn’t. Instead the Bishop moves swiftly to forgiveness (perhaps even
bypassing blame altogether?—this seems entirely possible if the Gifting habit is
sufficiently internalised) as a matter of moral gratuity—something on this occasion given,
startlingly, for free. Therein lies the genuinely distinctive moral meaning and value of

19

See, for instance, Griswold (2007); p. 121 n.5.
23

Gifted Forgiveness—something for nothing—and it is clearly parasitic on the moral
meaning and value of Moral Justice Forgiveness, which fixes the proper price, giving
nothing for nothing as a matter of principle.

That the notion of something gifted is parasitic on that of something paid for or otherwise
earned amounts to a conceptual dependence. And inherent in this conceptual dependence
are two distinct relations of priority, namely, the priority of the moral meaning of earned
forgiveness in relation to gifted forgiveness, and the priority of the moral value of earned
forgiveness in relation to gifted forgiveness. But, more surprisingly, we also confront an
unexpected implication of a rare but familiar kind in philosophy. The conceptual priority
of Moral Justice Forgiveness in relation to Gifted Forgiveness delivers a real-historical
implication that we can discern from the armchair as an item of synthetic a priori
knowledge. The pure conceptual priority entails that a practice of Gifted Forgiveness
could not have come first historically, for the meaning and moral value inherent in Gifted
Forgiveness are parasitic on those delivered in Moral Justice Forgiveness. As with the
quite general notion of something gifted (free stuff), the meaning and value of Gifted
Forgiveness depends heavily on the fact that something for which one must normally pay
is, on this occasion, being handed out for free. That is what makes this kind of
forgiveness extraordinary, and also what makes it on occasion so moving. It is precisely
the shock of gratuitous generosity from someone you have wronged that can sometimes
exert more transformative motivational power than the negative affect involved in the
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moral demand for remorse, which carries a greater risk of merely entrenching moral
hostilities.20

The conceptual derivativeness is true of both formations of Gifted Forgiveness that I shall
discuss. But there is a further dimension of derivativeness to the kind exemplified by the
Bishop—Valjean case, which leads me to label it Proleptic Gifted Forgiveness. For if we
look closely at how such cases of forgiveness play out, and what renders them formations
of forgiveness at all (something denied in Charles Griswold’s classic account, for
instance21) rather than a mere failure to hold the culprit responsible, we see that the
interpersonal mechanism is a proleptic one, and thus involves a certain curious
displacement in time. If we stand back from the distinctive interpersonal psychology of
this kind of forgiveness to focus instead on what underlying moral purpose the practice
serves, we can see that it is well designed to achieve the same point as Moral Justice
Forgiveness, but in a temporally displaced manner. In order to see how, we must
scrutinize how the prolepsis works.

Let me again start briefly with blame. The idea of a ‘proleptic mechanism’ is raised in
connection with blame in some remarks of Bernard Williams’ about how blame may
function productively even in cases where the wrongdoer does not recognize the reason
20

Relatedly, Glen Pettigrove discusses the ‘transformative power’ of what he calls

gracious forgiveness, which is forgiveness appropriately bestowed on someone who has
however done nothing to ‘merit’ it (see Pettigrove 2012; p. 140).
21

See Griswold 2007, p. 121.
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she is (at least in the blamer’s eyes) culpable for having failed to act upon.22 Blame may
function proleptically in such cases so long as the wrongdoer has at least some residual
respect or care for the blamer, so that she is moved by his protestations. What happens in
proleptic blame is that the blamer treats the wrongdoer as if she already recognized the
reason in question, and then, in virtue of her residual respect or care for the blamer, she is
caused in some measure to recognize the reason after the fact.23 How does this sort of
temporal displacement work in the case of forgiveness? My suggestion is that here, in the
example from Les Misérables, we see a similarly temporally extended interpersonal
mechanism played out to rearrange forgiveness in time. In forgiving the unremorseful
Valjean, the Bishop effectively treats Valjean as if he were already remorseful, thereby
displacing the normal precondition of forgiveness (the culprit’s remorseful
understanding) into the future as a hoped for outcome. And in so doing, given a basic
residual respect for the Bishop on Valjean’s part so that he is moved by the Bishop’s act
22

Williams (1995); and I have tried to develop the idea in Fricker (2014).
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Williams—who holds that a condition on possessing any practical reason is that it be

related by a ‘sound deliberative route’ to some motivation that the subject either has or
would have, absent errors of fact and of reasoning—naturally talks in terms not of
‘recognizing’ the moral reason in question, but rather of having it, or not, as the case may
be. For him, morally bad people really don’t have the moral reasons we wish they did—
therein lies their moral badness. His view of moral reasons as ‘fundamentally firstpersonal’, and therefore partial in the first instance, also implies that there will be times
when even morally all right people will not have the reasons we wish they had—therein
resides their freedom.
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of forgiveness, the Bishop may thereby cause Valjean to come to remorse after all. (The
proleptic forgiveness appeals to the culprit’s ‘better nature’, as we sometimes say, by
freeing it up front from the attempted coercions of moral demand.) Here, then, my
suggestion is that we see this exemplar of Gifted Forgiveness as performing the same
basic role as our paradigm, Moral Justice Forgiveness. For the Bishop is engaging in a
practice that, by way of a socially trained psychological shortcut, directly produces the
same immediate end that Moral Justice Forgiveness produces: namely, the forgiver’s
freedom from blame-feeling that is morally redundant.

Of course the blame-feeling that the Bishop could have justifiedly felt and communicated
is only redundant if it is in fact redundant. But is it? Not in the sense that it has already
done its job of prompting remorse in the culprit Valjean—obviously not. That is the
whole point; we are to imagine Valjean as not remorseful (not yet). Rather, any blamefeeling on the part of the Bishop is redundant simply because it is not needed—it has no
moral job to do. For the Bishop, the communication of blame is redundant either because
Valjean is a hopeless case as regards the point of blame (castigating him will only harden
his heart), and/or because there is a better chance of bringing him to see the error of his
ways if one rises above the justificatory cue for blame-feeling and instead moves directly
to forgiveness. Being forgiven when you’ve done nothing to deserve it brings a special
kind of moral shock, as we have already remarked, and one that tends to prompt remorse.
This is what renders the would-be blame-feeling on the part of the Bishop redundant from
the start—no job to do. Thus the underlying and basic point of the practice of Gifted
Forgiveness in which he is engaged is, in a manner concealed by the proleptic temporal

27

displacement, the very same as Moral Justice Forgiveness. Both kinds of forgiveness are
premised on the idea of a causal and normative connection with the culprit’s remorseful
appreciation of what he has done. But whereas Moral Justice Forgiveness demands the
remorse up front as a justificatory condition on the forswearing of blame-feeling, Gifted
Forgiveness forgoes any attempt at control-through-moral-demand. Instead the Gifting
Forgiver takes up a stance of non-demand, evincing the (passive yet sometimes
powerfully effective) hope that the culprit will come to remorsefully acknowledge the
moral meaning of his actions at a point in the not too distant future.

In sum, provided Gifted Forgiveness is prone to produce the same remorseful alignment
of moral understandings as Communicative Blame aims to produce, then to put it bluntly
there is no need for the Bishop to actually experience the blame-feeling reaction at all, for
gifting the forgiveness can do the same job—indeed in some cases, where the expression
of blame-feeling would only entrench matters, it will do the job more reliably.24 And this
multi-tasking capability of Gifted Forgiveness to perform the job of Communicative
Blame into the bargain is what makes the Bishop’s blame-feeling redundant from the
start, so that through a fully internalised habituation to the Gifting ethos he may forswear
24

Glen Pettigrove, in his illuminating discussion of what he calls ‘gracious’ or unmerited

forgiveness, points to work in psychology which indicates ‘that most people are inclined
to reciprocate a favour that has been done to them. While an angry response to injury
commonly provokes additional hostility in the person who caused it, a forgiving response
is more likely to encourage positive future relations between them’ (Pettigrove, 2012; p.
140).

28

justified blame-feeling before it even takes a hold—a possibility which represents a
maximally complete freedom from redundant blame-feeling. All this reveals proleptic
Gifted Forgiveness as a highly compacted moral response to wrongdoing, capable of
doing the jobs of both Communicative Blame and Moral Justice Forgiveness all in one
magnanimous reaction: it presupposes blameworthiness rather than standing on the
ceremony of actually communicating the blame, and it liberates the forgiver from
redundant blame-feeling from the outset, rather than waiting until its original justificatory
condition is actually met. The blame-feeling is redundant insofar as it is not needed to
prick the culprit’s conscience, for the gifting of the forgiveness itself is already apt to do
that.

Thus proleptic Gifted Forgiveness therefore manages to speed us through the more
plodding moral-emotional exchanges that Communicative Blame followed by Moral
Justice Forgiveness would bump us through—and which we normally need for an
authentic interpersonal progression. From a moral economic point of view (not that there
is such a thing), one might say that Gifted Forgiveness in its proleptic form is
extraordinarily morally efficient—it has built into it the sort of psychological and
normative streamlining that one might hope to see in a culturally evolved re-modelling of
Moral Justice Forgiveness. As an aside, however, it is also worth noticing that this very
moral-emotional virtuosity—specifically in its reliance on the spontaneous overcoming
of natural and justified blame-feeling—equally helps explain why Gifted Forgiveness is
peculiarly prone to passive-aggressive deformation and related brands of bad faith. The
deformation comes from something internal to this kind of forgiveness, namely the
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forswearing of blame-feeling that is in fact still justified. As we noted before, forswearing
blame-feeling is no guarantee that one ceases to feel it, and the passive-aggressive
deformation comes when the effort collapses into simple self-deception: the wishful
denial of blame-feelings that really remain as powerful as ever. In such cases the wouldbe forgiver cannot pull it off and winds up in a mere charade of gifted forgiving.

On the picture I have been presenting, then—a picture not of our moral motivations but
only of the rationale or logic of the moral practices in which we are engaged—proleptic
Gifted Forgiveness is revealed as a temporally displaced rearrangement of the elements
that compose the explanatorily basic practice of Moral Justice Forgiveness. Whereas
Moral Justice Forgiveness demands the remorseful alignment of moral understanding
before any forswearing of blame-feeling, Gifted Forgiveness takes its chances, lobbing
the hoped-for shared moral understanding into the future with a view to inspiring it after
the fact. Thus the culprit’s remorseful understanding of what she has done, which in
Moral Justice Forgiveness figures as a psychological cause and normative precondition,
is seen in the Gifted case to have metamorphosed into a psychological effect and
retrospective rationale. The element of remorseful understanding is deferred, and hoped
for, rather than demanded in the now.

The practice of Gifted Forgiveness thus emerges from our overall explanatory scheme as
a moral-cultural achievement, all the more precious for its historical contingency. Our
moral culture, after all, might have developed in a way that did not contain such a
practice. It might have stuck with formations of forgiveness that insisted it was earned
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through the culprit’s remorse before forgiveness could be appropriately forthcoming. But
instead, a certain generous-spirited alternative to the moral accountancy of justice has
developed for us to sometimes engage in as we may, diversifying our repertoire of moral
responses to wrongdoing, and reminding us that active engagement in the economy of
moral justice is not compulsory across the board—not even as regards the achievement of
the same morally progressive effect.

It is, without question, of fundamental importance in moral life that we generally blame
each other for bad things done and thereby hold each other in relations of moral demand,
because moral justice is fundamentally important in personal life as in institutional
practices. Without Communicative Blame we could not keep learning and re-learning
what matters to each other, and what subtle forms of moral hurt we may be thoughtlessly,
even innocently, engaged in. But it is a significant moral boon to have the option, at least
in some contexts, of stepping back with a sense that all things considered, this time there
is no need to ‘go there’. Or perhaps even, as it may have been with the Bishop and
Valjean, to step back and self-consciously judge that the only thing that can save him
now is his own conscience pricked by the gratuitous generosity of others.25 As others
25

In cultures influenced by Christian thinking, the formations of Gifted Forgiveness are

likely to be descended from the teachings of Jesus and the theological notion of Grace.
But this is not the only source, for ancient traditions of mercy, and of what Pettigrove
distinguishes as the ethical notion of grace, are also in the background: ‘This ethical
notion which has received so little attention in contemporary philosophy was quite
frequently discussed in Greek and Roman philosophy. Cicero, Seneca, and Chrysippus,
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have noted26, all forgiveness is attended by hope, and manifestly Moral Justice
Forgiveness already contains hope—hope that your moral demand will be met, hope that
the wrongdoer will feel sorry and see things more from your point of view, and so on.
But in proleptic forgiveness the hope element is far more exposed, because it is
undefended by interpersonal moral demand. The armour of anger or indignation is never
donned (or if it is, it is swiftly removed), which is why the gifting forgiver can appear
bewilderingly vulnerable and passive, and why her stance can look like mere condonation
or some other failure of moral nerve to those who would insist on engaging moral justice
in the face of every wrongdoing.

It must be said that some writers on forgiveness are decidedly suspicious of the Gifted
formation. Charles Griswold talks briefly of what he sceptically labels ‘prospective
forgiving’, dismissing it in deliciously sardonic tones:

One could argue that an excellent way to encourage the offender to repent is
precisely to forgive her even if she is unrepentant; bestowing this ‘gift’ opens a
moral door for the offender and leads the way through it. Now, it is possible that
the offender will see the light streaming in through that door, and that the
conditions for true forgiveness will be enacted backwards, as it were. One can
for example, each devoted considerable attention to what the Greeks called charis and the
Romans gratia. When we look at this older tradition, an important moral—as opposed to
theological—quality emerges’ (Pettigrove 2012; p. 125).
26

See, in particular, Walker 2006.
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imagine conditions under which ‘prospective forgiving’ is based on a reasonable
hunch about the person’s ability to change, if shown the way. My claim is that
whatever it is that the injured party is doing proleptically, it is not forgiving, but
something else that seeks to become forgiveness but has not yet crossed the
threshold as defined’ (pp. 121-2).

But ‘the threshold as defined’ refers to his definition which makes it a requirement of
forgiveness that the wrongdoer at least try to meet certain conditions of meriting
forgiveness that involve, in one way or another, appreciating that he has done wrong.
This completes the line of reasoning only to make a circle. If one defines forgiveness so
as to require (something like) remorse, then it follows that there can be no Gifted
Forgiveness of any kind; but so much the worse for the definition—it will have merely
limited its own capacity to help us understand our actual practices of forgiveness, which
plainly include cases of something normally called forgiveness in relation to wrongdoers
who are not, or not yet, remotely sorry for what they have done.

Social Remove—Distributed Gifted Forgiveness:
What about the second dimension of remove from the structure of Moral Justice
Forgiveness that may be exhibited in a case of Gifted Forgiveness? Is Gifted Forgiveness
sometimes not (or not only) displaced in time but rather socially displaced, so that the
wronged party may look to her community rather than to the culprit for the requisite
shared moral understanding? Many authors discuss striking, indeed sometimes
bewildering cases of Gifted Forgiveness in which someone forgives a horrifying wrong,
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such as the torture and murder of a loved one, regardless of whether the culprit is likely
ever to be remorseful, but where the forgiveness takes place in a social context of some
significant moral solidarity.27 Lucy Allais has discussed real-historical cases of this
kind—cases involving horrifying brutality and hatred—from the proceedings of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (Allais 2008). One may well wonder at
how forgiveness in such a case is even possible. But I believe we can render it less
bewildering, and indeed bring its normative structure into view, if we look once again at
where the crucial hoped-for element of shared moral understanding has been displaced to.
In proleptic cases we saw that the shared moral understanding was displaced in time and
deferred as a hoped-for prospect in the future. But the element of shared moral
understanding can also be displaced across social space—hence the label Distributed
Gifted Forgiveness. This is evidenced in many of the cases discussed by philosophers as
exemplars of Gifted Forgiveness, for they tend to involve a strong social, even
institutionalised structure of solidarity and shared moral understanding from which the
victim may draw strength and moral meaning. It is explicitly and formally so, I take it, in
the examples of forgiveness drawn from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
where the perspective of the moral community is institutionalised in the public hearings.
But of course it can be achieved more informally in any circumstances where the victim
has her own moral community (friends, colleagues, family) from which to draw the moral
27

See, for instance, Eve Garrard and David McNaughton’s discussion of Gordon

Wilson’s ‘unconditional’ forgiveness of the Enniskillen bombers (Garrard and
McNaughton 2002); and Lucy Allais’ discussion of two cases of ‘elective’ forgiveness
from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Allais, 2008).
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affirmation of shared understanding that she might otherwise expect, as per Moral Justice
Forgiveness, to source in the remorseful understanding of the culprit.

That it isn’t the culprit who is feeling bad for the victim, and that the emotion attending
the shared moral understanding cannot therefore be remorse but rather some correlative
form of affirming sympathy, comes to be less important to the potential forgiver if she
has this kind of support from third parties. Such multi-lateral third-party alignments of
moral understanding can be a powerful collective proxy for the wrongdoer’s remorse.
The power of solidarity of this kind is written about in different ways by various
theorists.28 Walker, for instance calls a lack of moral solidarity and alignment in one’s
moral community ‘normative abandonment’:

This explains a common phenomenon in the testimonies of victims: they often
experience as much or more rage, resentment, indignation, or humiliation in
response to the failure of other people and institutions to come to their aid,
acknowledge their injury, reaffirm standards, place blame appropriately on

28

See, for instance, Walker (2006), and MacLachlan (2008). Pamela Hieronymi too

specifically mentions the possibility of extending her account of forgiveness as justified
by apology to the territory of Gifted or ‘unilateral’ forgiveness: ‘Once can start to see
how the account might be extended to cases in which apologies are not offered. Perhaps
unilateral forgiveness (forgiveness of the unrepentant) is possible in cases in which the
one offended receives strong community support’ (p. 552-3).
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wrongdoers, and offer some forms of solace, safety, and relief, as they experience
toward the original wrongdoer (Walker 2006; p. 20).

What we see, I suggest, in cases of Distributed Gifted Forgiveness is once again a
displacement of the crucial precondition to Moral Justice Forgiveness—namely the
alignment of moral understandings—but this time across social space. Whereas in cases
of Moral Justice Forgiveness that alignment is required between victim and remorseful
culprit, in cases of Gifted Forgiveness it may be achieved between victim and a moral
community to which she belongs. This can do essentially the same job of affirming the
victim’s moral status and so enabling her, if she wishes, and if she can, to forgive the
unremorseful wrongdoer without collapsing into condonation or a mere failure to hold
him responsible. She may thus free herself of morally redundant blame-feeling towards
the wrongdoer for what he did, but sourcing the element of shared moral understanding
from elsewhere. That a moral culture should have cultivated such a practice to render this
kind of forgiveness both psychologically possible and normatively intelligible strikes me,
once again, as a moral boon—an enrichment in our repertoire of responses to
wrongdoing. It liberates the wronged party from redundant blame-feeling, and it
immediately shores up social-moral solidarity—which might be viewed as the lion’s
share of the value of getting any individual culprit to be remorseful anyway.

The principle idea put forward in this paper has been that the redundancy of blamefeeling is the core rationale for forgiving, where this redundancy is paradigmatically
brought about by the alignment of both parties’ moral understanding; but that in cases

36

where the culprit’s remorse is not forthcoming, the redundancy might equally (sometimes
more effectively) be brought about by alignments of moral understanding that are
displaced in time and/or social space. Thus Gifted Forgiveness has emerged as one or
other kind of partially displaced or ‘deconstructed’ Moral Justice Forgiveness. However,
it is no part of my intention to encourage the idea that the most important or most
valuable thing that forgiveness does is to be found in its most basic role; not at all.
Forgiveness, like most human practices, surely serves a family of purposes or functions,
and the question of the relative value of this or that function remains an open question.
Indeed the purpose of homing in on the most explanatorily basic function is precisely to
help us understand by what means forgiveness may perform distinct functions and
thereby achieve distinct related values. What comes into view is the range of other
valuable things that forgiveness can do for our shared moral life in virtue of fulfilling its
more basic and immediate function.

The most obvious secondary value served by forgiveness is the release of the culprit from
being the object of redundant blame-feeling. In freeing myself of redundant blamefeeling towards someone who has wronged me I may also liberate them from the
unpleasant sense of being its object. Some might be inclined to see this as simply part and
parcel of liberating myself from redundant blame-feeling, but that cannot be right. The
value of forgiveness for the culprit is not automatic, since it can only be realized if the
forgiveness is communicated; whereas the significant prior value of liberating myself
from redundant blame-feeling may be achieved in private, and in relation to a wrongdoer
whom I choose not to tell, or who is dead or otherwise unreachable. I think this first-
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personal, non-relational value of the basic function of forgiveness is not remotely
surprising, as we clearly have what David Owens has called a ‘remissive interest’ in
being able to forgive.29 We can support the general point with some testimony from
figures whom history has tragically burdened with considerable personal authority on the
subject of forgiveness. For example Eva Kor, who survived the tortures of Mengele’s
experiments on her and her twin sister in Auschwitz, has written ‘Forgiveness is really
nothing more than an act of self-healing and self-empowerment’ (Cantacuzino, 2015; p.
47), and she teaches others who wish to forgive grievous wrongdoing that they can ‘take
a piece of paper and a pen and write a letter to someone who hurt them’, but she issues
the firm plea: ‘Please do not mail it to that person. It’s for you to know that you forgive,
and you can go on with your life without the burden and pain that the Nazis or anybody
else ever imposed on you’ (New England Public Radio, May 24 2015).30

29

See Owens (2010) pp. 59-60. On his view our interest in being able to forgive is
ultimately grounded in a more basic alleged interest in being able to render blame and
guilt inapt, where this is in turn conceived as partly constitutive of the value of friendship
(p. 58). By contrast, in the view I advance here, our remissive interest in being able to
forgive simply derives from the burdensome, potentially corrosive, nature of harbouring
blame-feeling that can serve no morally progressive purpose.
30
Another personal testimony—one of many recounted in Cantacuzino’s book to present
forgiveness as primarily an act of self-liberation—is Bud Welch’s story of ultimately
forgiving Timothy McVeigh for his part in the Oklahoma City bombing in which Mr
Welch’s 23-year old daughter, Julie Marie, was killed: ‘About a year before the execution
I found it in my heart to forgive Tim McVeigh. It was a release for me rather than for
him’ (Cantacuzino 2015; p. 60).
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Besides the value to the culprit that comes from communicated forgiveness, there are
three other secondary (as I would have it) values served by forgiveness which tend to be
focused on by philosophers. Thus Walker reminds us: ‘three features of forgiveness that
are commonly argued or assumed in philosophical discussions of forgiveness to be the
“key” or “essential” elements. Philosophers speak of “overcoming resentment,”
“restoring relationship,” and “setting a wrong to rest in the past” as essential marks of
forgiveness’ (Walker 2006; p. 153). Indeed they do; and they are not wrong. But
something I hope to have shown by applying the paradigm-based method to forgiveness
is that all three of these values are functionally secondary in that they can only be
properly served in virtue of the first—the liberation of the wronged party from redundant
blame-feeling. The forgiver’s liberation from such blame-feeling is conceptually and
psychologically the more basic achievement of forgiveness—the condition of any further
liberations or values that may flow from it. Let us briefly review Walker’s list of three
marks of forgiveness commonly regarded as essential, so that we come to see that in each
case the forgiver’s liberation specifically from redundant blame-feeling (and not blamefeeling per se) either is the proper way to view it, or else constitutes the precondition.
First, in the case of ‘overcoming resentment’ (or overcoming blame-feeling) we see it can
only be the forgiver’s liberation from redundant blame-feeling that constitutes the
appropriate kind of ‘overcoming resentment’—for the overcoming of resentment that still
has a progressive moral job to do would inevitably be forgiveness of a premature kind.
Second, as regards the purpose of restoring relationships in a morally progressive manner
as opposed to merely resuming them through the denial or suppression of hurt, once
again it is only the expunging of redundant blame-feeling that can do the progressive
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restorative work, since expunging non-redundant blame-feeling could only be premature.
And, third, as regards the process by which a moral injury may be properly consigned to
the past rather than merely repressed or forgotten, once again it is only redundant blamefeelings that can justifiedly be left behind precisely because they are, or have become,
lacking in moral purpose. In all three cases, were the blame-feelings not yet redundant,
they would still have moral work to do, so that jettisoning the blame-feeling would
merely be to forgive prematurely or perhaps fail to forgive at all, slipping instead into
sheer denial or forgetting.

Thus the various good things that forgiveness may do for us are all dependent upon the
prior fulfilment of the most basic point of both Moral Justice Forgiveness and also, I have
argued, the socially and temporally displaced formations of it that constitute our practices
of Gifted Forgiveness. What we have seen, in my depiction of Gifted Forgiveness, is the
continued presence of the normative precondition for Moral Justice Forgiveness (shared
moral understanding on the part of the wrongdoer) but in deceptively concealed form
owing to its temporal and/or social displacement. The resulting picture is, I hope, an
explanatorily satisfying ordered pluralism: two main kinds of forgiveness—one cast as
(more or less) humanly necessary and explanatorily basic, the other cast as a cultural
creation and contingent variation on the basic theme—each of which is respected as
importantly different from the other at the level of moral psychology and moral meaning,
and yet both of which are revealed, if we step back to survey the moral-social system, as
fundamentally playing the same basic role in regulating how we respond to wrongdoing:
the primary and unifying purpose of our two very different varieties of forgiveness, then,
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is to liberate morally wronged parties from the corrosive tendency of redundant blamefeeling—for redundant blame-feeling can do no good.31
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